Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Republic Outdoor Advertising v. Department of
Transportation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent A. Burnett; assistant attorney general; Paul H. Roberts; Leslie Van Frank; Bradley M.
Strassberg; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, PC; attorneys for appellees.
Steven A. Wuthrich; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Republic Outdoor Advertising v. Department of Transportation, No. 20081058 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1388

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, L.C.,

APPELLEE BRIEF OF
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC.

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Appellate Case No. 20081058
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; R.0 A.
GENERAL, INC.; and CITY OF SOUTH
SALT LAKE,

Third District Court No. 040905336

Defendants and Appellees.

Steven A. Wuthrich
1011 Washington, Suite 101
Montpelier, ID 83254
Attorney for Appellant

Brent A. Burnett (Bar No. 4003)
Asst. Attorney General
P.O. Box 140858
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorney for Appellee UDOT
Paul H. Roberts (Bar. No. 11758)
220 East Morris Ave, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Attorney for Appellee South Salt Lake City
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994)
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, PC
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
PO Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Attorneys for Appellee R.O.A. General, Inc.
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JAN 2 9 2010

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

REPUBLIC OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, L.C.,

APPELLEE BRIEF OF
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC.

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Appellate Case No. 20081058

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; R.O.A.
GENERAL, INC.; and CITY OF SOUTH
SALT LAKE,

Third District Court No. 040905336

Defendants and Appellees.

Steven A. Wuthrich
1011 Washington, Suite 101
Montpelier, ID 83254
Attorney for Appellant

Brent A. Burnett (Bar No. 4003)
Asst. Attorney General
P.O. Box 140858
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorney for Appellee UDOT
Paul H. Roberts (Bar. No. 11758)
220 East Morris Ave, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Attorney for Appellee South Salt Lake City
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994)
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, PC
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
PO Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Attorneys for Appellee R.O.A. General, Inc.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, Appellee R.0 A. General, Inc.
(hereafter "Reagan") submits the following appellate brief, replying to the arguments of
Appellant Republic Outdoor Advertising, L.C. (hereafter "Republic").
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

iv

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues

1

Controlling Statute

3

Statement of the Case

3

Statement of Relevant Facts

5

Summary of Arguments

11

Argument
A.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE DENIAL OF
REPUBLIC'S DECK HOCKEY APPLICATION

13

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW REPUBLIC S
ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE LINDAL PERMIT
1.

2.

3.

13

14

The District Court Correctly Found that the Lindal Proceedings
were Formal

17

The District Court Correctly Found that Republic had
a Right to Intervene in the Lindal Proceedings

19

Whether a Party Has Exhausted its Administrative Remedies
Is a Legal, Not a Factual Determination

20

ii

4.

Republic Had an Obligation to Protect its Own Rights,
Not Rely on UDOT to Tell it How to Proceed

21

The Deck Hockey Proceeding Was an Improper Venue
to Challenge the Lindal Permit

23

REPUBLIC'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING REAGAN'S R-407
APPLICATION ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT,
AS THE DISTRICT COURT NEVER MADE A RULING ON
THE ISSUES RAISED

28

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED IT LACKED
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER REPUBLIC'S
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO THE WILDERNESS PERMITS RAISED
IN THE "SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT"

29

5.

C.

D.

1.

2.

E.

F.

Republic Fails to Show the District Court Erred When it
Determined That Republic Failed to Exhaust its Administrative
Remedies in Relation to the SSL Wilderness Permit

30

Republic Fails to Show the District Court Erred When it
Determined That Republic Failed to Exhaust its Administrative
Remedies in Relation to the UDOT Wilderness Permit

36

REPUBLIC HAS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ITS ASSERTIONS
OF "BIAS" OR "MANIFEST INJUSTICE"

41

THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTED REPUBLIC A TRIAL DE NOVO,
AND PROPERLY LIMITED REPUBLIC TO INTRODUCING
EVIDENCE UNRELATED TO THE REAGAN PERMITS

45

Conclusion

46

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323
30, 42
Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
24
Brinton v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956 (Utah 1998)
25
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
457 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
32
Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 70, 180 P.3d 778
1,2, 21, 22-23
Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 100 P.3d 1171
34-35
Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, 217 P.3d 723
30
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966
18
Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 904 P.2d 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
40, 46
Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, 89 P.3d 171
32
Holladay Towne Center, LLC v. Holladay City, 2008 UT App 301, 192 P.3d 302 . . . . 24
Jennings Invest., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, 208 P.3d 1077 . . . 18
Mack v. Utah State Dept. of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79
21
Millard Co. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991)
20
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180
42-43
Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 106 P.3d 455 (Idaho 2005)
43
Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976)
31
Panos v. Olsen and Associates Const., Inc., 2005 UT App 446, 123 P.3d 816
47
S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990)
20
Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922
1,2
State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989)
41
Sur. Underwriters v. E&FC Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, 10 P.3d 338
2
Tasters Ltd. v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 863 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994)
40-41
TDM, Inc. v. Tax Com'n, 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190
42
th
U.S. v. 4 Dist. Court, 238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951)
45
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
28
Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 10-9-1002(l)(a) (2001)
§ 10-9a-703
§ 63-46b-3(l) (1991)
§ 63-46b-3(3)(b)
§ 63-46b-3(4)
§ 63-46b-3(7)

34
35
26
26
37, 38
21
iv

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 through § 63-46M1
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9 (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(l) (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(a)
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-507(6)
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-508(1) and (3)
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)
Utah Admin. Code R907-1
Utah Admin. Code R907-1-1 (2002)
Utah Admin. Code R907-1-3
Utah Admin. Code R907-1-5(K) (1997)
Utah Admin. Code R907-l-10(14)(a) (2003)
Utah Admin. Code R907-1-15 (2002)
Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3(16)
SSL Ordinance §17.02.030.K

v

7, 17
19
19
23
20
27
19
1, 3, 13
14
25
1
26
21
37, 38
18
27
23
13
31, 35

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4103(2)(a). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Republic's Deck Hockey application was properly denied by UDOT's
hearing officer and properly upheld by the trial court because of the
simple undisputed fact that another outdoor advertising sign physically
existed within 500 feet of Republic's proposed location.

This is a legal issue requiring application of the controlling statute, Utah Code
Annotated § 72-7-505(3 )(a), to undisputed facts. This Court "afford[s] no deference to
the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness." Schaerrer v.
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922. The issue was preserved in
the district court's November 24, 2008 Final Order and Judgment (R.3493-97).
2.

The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims concerning Reagan's Lindal
Permit.

The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is a question of law. Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App
70, ^[8-10, 180P.3d778. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Schaerrer v.
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., supra. This issue was preserved in the district court's
October 1, 2008 Order and Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically ^ 3.01 to 3.05).
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3.

The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims concerning the SSL
Wilderness Permit.

The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is a question of law. Decker v. Rolfe, supra. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc.,
supra. This issue was preserved in the district court's October 1, 2008 Order and
Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically fflf 5.01 to 5.09).
4.

The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims concerning the UDOT
Wilderness Permit.

The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is a question of law. Decker v. Rolfe, supra. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc.,
supra. This issue was preserved in the district court's October 1, 2008 Order and
Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically fflf 4.01 to 4.10).
5.

The district court correctly determined that Republic failed to present
sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of material fact that
would demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of
remedies requirements apply.

In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, this court reviews the facts and
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sur. Underwriters
v. E&FC Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, 10 P.3d 338. This issue was preserved in the district
court's October 1, 2008 Order and Judgment (R.3476-88, specificallyffif3.04, 4.09, 5.04.).
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CONTROLLING STATUTE
Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set forth in
Subsection 72-7-504(1) or in H-1 zones may not be closer than 500feet
to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway or
limited access primary highway, except that signs may be erected closer
than 500 feet if the signs on the same side of the interstate highway or
limited access primary highway are not simultaneously visible.
Utah Code. Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(a) (emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Republic's "Nature of the Case" section of its brief can be ignored. See Republic's
Brief, pp. 5-8. It consists mostly of a vitriolic diatribe, lacks any record citations, and
provides little assistance with this Court's review of the relevant issues.
This appeal is about (1) whether the district court correctly upheld the decision of a
UDOT administrative hearing officer to deny Republic's request to build an outdoor
advertising sign, see November 20, 2008 Final Order and Judgment, R.3493-98, and (2)
whether the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in
this administrative appeal to consider other claims raised by Republic, see Sept. 30, 2008
Order and Judgment R.3476-88).
The necessary procedural background is not complex. Republic filed an application with UDOT for an outdoor advertising sign, referred to herein as the "Deck Hockey"
sign. See Compl., pp. 1-6 (R.l-6); First Am. Compl. and Supp. Compl, pp. 1-5 (R.68993). A UDOT permit officer denied this application because the proposed Deck Hockey
sign was too close in proximity to a Reagan sign, referred to herein as the "Lindal sign."
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See Compl., ^ 10 (R.2). A UDOT administrative hearing officer upheld the permits
officer's denial of Republic's application for the Deck Hockey sign. Republic then
appealed to the district court. See id., ^ 12 (R.3).
However, pursuant to its First Amended Complaint and Supplemental Complaint,
id, Republic did not simply seek re-examination of the discrete question of whether the
Deck Hockey application had been properly denied; it sought new and additional relief
against parties that had not been a part of the UDOT administrative proceedings on
appeal. In its amended pleadings, Republic named not only UDOT, but South Salt Lake
City ("SSL") and Reagan. See First Am. Compl. and Supp. Compl (R.689-93). In
addition to asserting that UDOT had improperly denied its own permit application,
Republic sought a determination from the district court that Reagan's Lindal Permit,
along with Reagan's permits for two other signs, were void. See id. One of these signs is
referred to as the "Wilderness" sign (the district court referred to it as the "WLH" sign).
This sign involved permits both from SSL (hereafter the "SSL Wilderness Permit") and
from UDOT (the "UDOT Wilderness Permit"). See idl
Reagan and the other defendants/appellees each moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's
claims concerning Reagan's permits. See, e.g., Reagan's First and Second Motions for

1

The district court dismissed Republic's claims concerning the "Russell sign" for
lack of standing. See, Sept. Order, R.3487. This dismissal is not on appeal.
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Summary Judgment (R. 1207-09, 1328-29). The district court agreed with the defendants/
appellees and determined that Republic had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies
in relation to its objections to the Lindal Permit, the SSL Wilderness Permit and the
UDOT Wilderness Permit issued to Reagan. See September 30, 2008 Order and
Judgment (R.3476-88) ("Sept. Order"). Based on this determination, it granted the
defendants '/appellees' motions for summary judgment relating to each of these permits.
See, id. UDOT then moved for summary judgment that the administrative hearing officer
had properly denied Republic's Deck Hockey application. Based on the undisputed existence of the Lindal sign within 500 feet of the proposed Deck Hockey location, the district
court granted UDOT's motion. See, Final Order and Judgment, R.3494-97 ("Nov.
Judgment").
Accordingly, there are only two question for this Court: (1) whether the district
court correctly upheld the administrative hearing officer's denial of Republic's Deck
Hockey application, and (2) whether the district court correctly determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to make any rulings with respect to Reagan's permits (the
Lindal Permit, the SSL Wilderness Permit and the UDOT Wilderness Permit).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Republic's "Statement of the Facts," does not set forth facts that will assist this
Court with its review of the district court's determination. Republic does not show what
facts were properly presented to the district court on the defendants'/appellees' respective
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motions for summary judgment, and mostly delves into facts that have nothing to do with
the questions on appeal. Most of the "facts" asserted by Republic describe Republic's
perception of the validity of Reagan's various permits. See Republic's Brief, pp. 10-11,
13-20. This has no bearing whatsoever on the questions at hand, to wit, whether Republic
properly exhausted its administrative remedies regarding Reagan's sign permits, and
whether the proximity of the Lindal sign to the proposed Deck Hockey location was a
sufficient basis for the hearing officer to deny the Deck Hockey application.
The district court made numerous factual findings in its Sept. Order (R.3476-81)
and its Nov. Judgment (R.3493-98) that accurately describe the background necessary for
an appellate determination. As set forth at footnote 3 below, Republic has challenged
only one of these facts, paragraph 1.09 of the Sept. Order, but this challenge is neither
material nor relevant. See infra, p. 17 n.3. Accordingly, Reagan sets forth the relevant
undisputed facts verbatim (including parentheses) as determined by the district court:
September Order
1.01. On or about May 13, 2002, Republic applied to UDOT for an outdoor
advertising permit in connection with a proposed billboard on property known in this
litigation as the "Deck Hockey property."
1.02. UDOT's permits officer denied Republic's application on July 31, 2003, on
the basis that the proposed location was within 500 feet of a sign location that several
months earlier had been permitted to Reagan (the "Lindal" permit or the "Lindal" sign),
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and that the Deck Hockey Permit would not be allowed under the spacing requirements of
Utah law governing outdoor advertising.
1.03. After an informal hearing on Republic's appeal of that denial, UDOT's
administrative hearing officer upheld the permits officer's denial of Republic's
application for the Deck Hockey permit. Republic appealed to this Court.
1.04. Republic asserts, inter alia, that UDOT improperly issued the Permit to
Reagan.
1.05. In February 1998, Reagan submitted applications to move three billboards
in the vicinity north of the Deck Hockey property. One of those applications concerned
the Permit. UDOT's permits officer had denied those applications and Reagan invoked
UDOT's appellate procedures to challenge that denial.
1.06. On September 22, 1998, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an
order stating that further proceedings regarding Reagan's appeal "shall be conducted
formally according to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through 63-46b-l 1." That order was
never revoked.
1.07. On February 1, 1999, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an
order upholding the permits officer's denial of Reagan's applications. Reagan appealed
that decision to the Third District Court.
1.08. On March 8, 2000, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, the
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district court vacated the February 1, 1999 UDOT order and remanded the case to
facilitate settlement negotiations between UDOT and Reagan.
1.09. As of May 2002, Republic knew that UDOT was considering issuing the
Permit to Reagan, but had not yet done so.
1.10. Republic also knew in May 2002 that UDOT had taken the position that it
would consider Reagan's application for the Permit before it would consider an
application from Republic within 500 feet.
1.11. In May 2002, Republic believed that the original building permit Reagan
had received from SSL for the Lindal sign had expired, and that another SSL building
permit that Republic held in the area would preclude UDOT from issuing the Permit.
1.12. Republic knew no later than November 2002 that a decision to grant
Reagan's Lindal application would automatically be a decision to deny Republic's Deck
Hockey application.
1.13. Republic did not undertake any action to formally request to intervene in
UDOT's proceedings concerning Reagan's application for the Permit ("Lindal
proceedings").
1.14. On January 23, 2003, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan,
UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an "Order on Partial Settlement," finding
that Reagan's application for the Permit was not precluded by law, and ordering UDOT to
immediately issue a permit to Reagan.
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1.15. UDOT issued the Permit, and then denied Republic's application for the
Deck Hockey permit on July 31, 2003.
1.16. On September 21, 2005, Reagan applied for and received from SSL a
permit to erect a billboard on property known as Wilderness Log Homes (the "Wilderness
Property"), which is approximately 500 feet to the South of the Lindal billboard.
1.17. On October 24, 2006, Reagan applied for and received a permit from
UDOT to erect the billboard on the Wilderness Property.
1.18. Reagan built the Wilderness billboard in January 2006, and removed the
Lindal billboard.
1.19. The Wilderness sign was within 500 feet of the location where Republic
proposed to build the Deck Hockey sign.
***** [district court deleted proposed finding].
1.21

On February 28, 2006 Republic, submitted a GRAMA request to SSL,

asking for copies of Reagan's permit application for the Wilderness billboard.
1.22. Republic did not file an appeal of SSL's decision to issue the Wilderness
permit at any time within the next 10 days.
1.23. Republic did not file an appeal of UDOT's decision to issue the Wilderness
Permit at any time within the next 30 days.
1.24. In a hearing on October 3, 2006 regarding a Motion to Dismiss brought by
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UDOT and a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Republic, this Court (Judge
Hilder) ordered Republic to amend its complaint within ten days to join Reagan. The
order on that hearing was signed and entered on October 24, 2006.
1.25. On October 10, 2006, Republic sent UDOT a letter demanding that UDOT
revoke Reagan's Wilderness Permit and the permit for another Reagan sign that is across
the freeway (the "Russell sign" or the "Russell permit"). The letter also demanded that
UDOT make certain declarations regarding the Russell sign, and also that UDOT declare
that the Deck Hockey application preceded the Wilderness application and that the
Wilderness Permit was void on the basis of various allegations.
1.26. During briefing and oral argument on the current motions. Republic
conceded that it had no standing to make any challenge to the Russell sign or permit.
1.27. On October 26, 2006, Republic amended its Complaint and filed its
Supplemental Complaint in this litigation, bringing both Reagan and SSL in as
defendants.
1.28. On October 31, 2006, UDOT responded to Republic's October 10th demand,
stating that "the statute prohibits us from initiating declaratory proceedings.. . . Although
prohibited from investigating your claims by a declaratory action, I will direct the
Department's staff to look into your allegations and take whatever administrative action
they may find necessary. I have asked them to complete their investigation within 30
days and report back to me with their findings."
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1.29. On December 14, 2006, Republic filed with this Court a pleading entitled
"Notice of Filing of Documents re: Exhaustion of Remedies on Wilderness Log Homes
Sign and Supplemental Documents Concerning Lindal Cedar Homes Sign" (hereafter
"Notice re: Exhaustion of Remedies"). In that document, Republic stated, "More than 30
days have elapsed since the receipt of the October 31st letter and . . . no action has been
taken to either correct or revoke the Reagan permits."
1.30. Republic did not file or ask leave to file any new complaint until March 5,
2007.
November Judgment
D.

The existing sign at the time of the denial of Republic's application was

owned by Reagan and was located at the north end of real property referred to in this
litigation as the "Lindal property."
E.

The distance between the proposed Deck Hockey sign location and the

Lindal sign location was closer than 500 feet.
F.

The Lindal sign was built in its permitted location.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The district court properly upheld the UDOT hearing officer's denial of Republic's
Deck Hockey application, regardless of Republic's arguments concerning the validity or
invalidity of any of Reagan's permits, as the proposed Deck Hockey location was within
500 feet of an existing sign.
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For numerous reasons, the district court correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to review Republic's arguments regarding the Lindal Permit. The district
court correctly ruled that the Lindal Proceedings were formal, that Republic had a right to
but did not intervene in those proceedings, and that Republic had, as a consequence,
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Republic fails to show any error in
connection with any of these determinations. To the contrary, there is no dispute that
Republic failed to intervene in the Lindal Proceedings and that its failure prevents it from
making a collateral challenge to the outcome of those proceedings. In addition, Republic
has failed to set forth any facts that could show the district court erred when it determined
that no exception to the exhaustion doctrine applied in this case
Republic's third, fourth and ninth arguments on appeal each discuss the merits of
Republic's arguments relating to the validity of Reagan's permits. These arguments were
not ruled on by the district court, as they were rendered moot by the district court's
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Republic fails to show that the district court erred when it determined that it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's arguments relating to both the
SSL and the UDOT Wilderness Permits. Once again, these determinations rested on the
fact that Republic failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Republic is unable to
show any error on the part of the district court and is unable to point to any facts of record
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that could show that the district court should have excused Republic from the exhaustion
requirement.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE DENIAL OF
REPUBLIC'S DECK HOCKEY APPLICATION.
Utah law prohibits UDOT from issuing outdoor advertising permits if the result

would have two outdoor advertising signs physically located closer than 500 feet from
each other. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(a) (a sign "may not be closer than 500
feet to an existing off-premise sign").2 The district court referenced this controlling
statute in its final conclusions of law in this case. See, Nov. Judgment, par. 3. (R.3495).
The district court found that at the time the permit officer denied Republic's Deck
Hockey application, Reagan's Lindal sign physically existed within 500 feet of
Republic's proposed location. Id., pars. C, D, E, and 4 (R.3495). Based on these
undisputed findings and the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3 )(a), the district
found that UDOT's hearing officer had properly denied Republic's application for a
permit. Id.
Republic has not challenged these factual findings. Republic has not even
mentioned in its Brief how the controlling statute and the physical proximity of the Lindal

2

An "off-premise sign" is "an outdoor advertising sign that advertises an activity,
service, or product and that is located on premises other than the premises at which
activity or service occurs or product is sold or manufactured." Utah Admin. Code R9332-3(16).
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sign affected its Deck Hockey application. Instead, Republic has attacked the validity of
the UDOT permit that Reagan had for the Lindal sign. This is apparently because in
addition to upholding the hearing officer on the basis of the physical proximity of the
Lindal sign, the district court also noted that Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-507(6) would
prohibit UDOT from issuing an outdoor advertising permit "within 500 feet of a
permitted sign location except to the permit holder...." (R.3495). This would provide an
alternate ground on which to uphold the administrative hearing officer's denial of the
Deck Hockey application. Republic hopes to convince this Court that if the Lindal Permit
was void, then the Lindal sign was not in a permitted location and the hearing officer
should have granted Republic's Deck Hockey application. But nothing Republic can say
about the validity or invalidity of Reagan's permits helps it on this appeal. The
undisputed physical proximity of the existing sign and the proposed sign is sufficient
alone to affirm the district court's ruling.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT DID NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW REPUBLIC'S ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING THE LINDAL PERMIT.
To assess the claims asserted by Republic in the first issue that it states on appeal,

it is important to understand the context in which they are presented. Republic's district
court action is an appeal of an administrative proceeding concerning Republic's
application to UDOT for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising on Deck Hockey. See,
CompL, f6 (R.l-6). UDOT's permits officer had denied Republic's application because
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the proposed sign was too close in proximity to Reagan's sign on the Lindal property.
See id, f 10 (R.2). Republic then appealed the denial of its own application to UDOT's
administrative hearing officer, (see, id. at <f 11). In a proceeding in which Reagan was not
a party, Republic purported to challenge the validity of UDOT's actions in granting
Reagan's permit. Id. at ^ 14-17. The administrative hearing officer upheld the permit
officer's denial of Republic's application for the Deck Hockey sign. See id. Republic
then appealed to the district court. At the district court, Republic again did not simply
seek re-examination of the question of whether its own Deck Hockey application had
been properly denied. Instead, it continued its quest, in the absence of Reagan, for a
determination that the permit was invalid. See First Am. Compl. and Supp. Compl.
(R.689-701).
Republic spends much of its brief explaining the proceedings whereby Reagan
received the Lindal Permit. In short, Reagan filed its application for the Lindal Permit in
1998, the application was denied, Reagan appealed to a UDOT administrative hearing
officer who also denied the request, Reagan appealed to the district court, UDOT and
Reagan subsequently stipulated and the district court ordered that the hearing officer's
order be vacated so that the parties could pursue settlement, UDOT and Reagan
ultimately settled and the Lindal Permit was issued. (R.3477-79). In the interim, after the
remand from the district court and before the Lindal Permit was issued, Republic
submitted its application to build a sign on the nearby Deck Hockey property. Id.
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Republic had knowledge that the Lindal proceedings were under way. It had a
right to intervene in them, but did not do so. Thus, Republic's attack on the Lindal Permit
amounts to a collateral attack on a prior determination in a proceeding in which Republic
had the opportunity to, but did not, participate. Republic did not attempt to avail itself of,
let alone exhaust, its administrative remedies, and therefore could not assert its arguments
concerning the Lindal Permit for the first time to the district court. Accordingly, the
district court properly determined that it had no subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed
the action.
Republic asserts that the district court erred when it ruled that: (1) the Lindal
proceedings were formal proceedings; (2) to which intervention was permitted; and (3)
that Republic had "somehow failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not intervening
therein.'5 Republic's Brief, p. 27. Republic's argument ignores the undisputed facts as
determined by the district court, as well as applicable statutes, regulations and cases. The
legal conclusions entered by the district court are as follows:
3.01. The Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings at all
times after UDOT's administrative hearing officer entered his
September 22, 1998 order.
3.02. Republic had a right to intervene in the Lindal
proceedings, but could do so only by filing a signed written
petition with UDOT before UDOT's administrative hearing
officer issued his order requiring UDOT to issue the Permit to
[Reagan].
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3.03. Since Republic did not intervene in the Lindal
proceedings, Republic did not exhaust its available
administrative remedies.
3.04. Republic has failed to present sufficient
evidence to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would
demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of
remedies requirements applies.
3.05. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Republic's claims concerning the Permit.
Order & Judgment,ffif3.01-3.05.
These conclusions were based on the district court's undisputed factual findings
that UDOT issued an order stating that "further proceedings regarding Reagan's appeal
'shall be conducted formally according to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through 63-46b11,'" id., \ 1.06, that Republic was aware of the existence of those proceedings and the
effect a determination therein would have on its own permit, id., ^fl[ 1.09-1.12, and that
Republic did not seek to intervene in those proceedings, id., ^ 1.13.
1.

The District Court Correctly Found that the Lindal Proceedings were
Formal.

Republic does not specifically challenge the undisputed factual findings made by
the district court that support this determination.3 In any event, there is no question that
3

The only attempt to contest any of the facts the district court found undisputed is
found in a footnote at page 55 of Republic's Brief. However, close inspection reveals
that Republic mostly challenges the district court's conclusions, rather than its factual
findings. Republic "disputes" paragraphs 3.01, 4.02, 5.03, and 5.06. See id. Each of
these were conclusions of law. (R.3482, 3484-86.) The only fact disputed by Republic is
that it knew as of May 2002 that UDOT was considering the permit. Republic's Brief, p.
(continued...)
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the Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings. The September 22, 1998 UDOT Order
unequivocally declared that, due to Reagan's request for hearing, further proceedings
would be conducted formally. See September 22, 1998 UDOT Order. (R.2662-2710, Ex.
C to Affidavit of Daniel A. Reagan). This determination is consistent with the applicable
provision of the Utah Administrative Code, which in 1997 provided that "[a]ny written
request for hearing shall be treated as converting the process from an informal process to
a formal process." Utah Admin. Code R907-1-5(K) (1997). Subsequently, the February
1, 1999 UDOT Order reiterated that "[t]he above matter came on for a formal
3

(...continued)
55 n. 38. This fact was based on a statement made by Republic representatives in May
2002 to UDOT, including, inter alia, "if UDOT is going to take a position denying one of
two competitors a permit under 'preemption' it must do so by denying the [Lindal]
application and not the Republic application." See, generally, record citations in
Reagan's Reply Memorandum in Support of its First Dispositive Motion, pp. 3-4
(R.2752-53). Regardless, Republic admits that it had such knowledge as of Fall 2002. Id,
The district court found that "Republic knew no later than November 2002 that a decision
to grant Reagan's Lindal application would automatically be a decision to deny
Republic's Deck Hockey application," (R.3479, par. 1.12). This was at least two months
before the hearing officer issued its January 2003 order requiring UDOT to issue the
Lindal Permit. (R.3479, % 1.14.) Thus, this dispute is not a material one that makes any
difference to the outcome of this case. Aside from this immaterial fact, Republic has
failed to specify any particular fact at issue, let alone explain why that fact was incorrectly
determined to be undisputed by the district court, and thus has failed to meet its burden on
appeal. See Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ^ 53, 201 P.3d 966 ("When,
as here, the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the
basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact."
(quotations and citation omitted.); see also Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Biding Club, Inc.,
2009 UT App 119, \ 26, 208 P.3d 1077 ("A district court is not obliged to comb the
record to determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists to prevent
summary judgment. Rather, it is the nonmoving party's burden to demonstrate that such a
conflict exists.").
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administrative hearing...." February 1, 1999 UDOT Order, p. 1, attached as Exhibit C-2
to Reagan's memorandum in support of its first summary judgment motion (R.12101327). Thus, the district court correctly determined that the Lindal proceedings were
formal.
Republic admits that the Lindal proceedings were formal in 1998, but suggests that
they somehow lost their formal character by 2002. (Republic's Brief, pp. 27-29).
Republic cites no legal authority for this assertion. Rather than address the governing
rules applied by the district court, Republic cites R-901-1-1, Utah Administrative Code,
"effective 2/02/2002," for the proposition that there is a presumption that administrative
appeals are "informal in nature." Republic's Brief, p. 28. Republic fails to explain how
or why this rule would or should be retroactively applied to alter the nature of
proceedings that became formal in 1998. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("No part of these
revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared"). The district court's legal
conclusion that "[t]he Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings at all times after
UDOT's administrative hearing officer entered his September 22, 1998 order" should not
be disturbed.
2.

The District Court Correctly Found that Republic had a Right to
Intervene in the Lindal Proceedings.

Under Utah Code section 63-46b-95 "any person not a party may file a signed
written petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(l) (2001). Republic's ability to intervene in the Lindal
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proceedings under this statute was not merely permissive, but one of right. See id; see
also Millard Co. v. Utah State Tax Com % 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991). Had Republic
intervened, it could then have appealed any order issued therein to the district court. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (2001). It is undisputed that Republic did not take
advantage of this administrative remedy. Thus, Republic failed to present its position,
and UDOT's hearing officer granted the permit without Republic's input.
The "requirement of participation at agency level 'ensures that those who have an
interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant facts and considerations at the
time the agency makes its decision.'" S&G v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990)
(citation omitted). Without Republic there to make its own arguments, the hearing officer
presiding in the Lindal proceedings had no reason or opportunity to even consider them.
3.

Whether a Party Has Exhausted its Administrative Remedies Is a
Legal, Not a Factual Determination.

Republic does not address, let alone distinguish, these governing statutes or
regulations, and makes no argument as to how the district court misapplied them.
Republic instead argues that the district court erred because it did not construe facts in a
light most favorable to Republic when it determined whether the Lindal proceedings were
formal or informal. See Republic's Brief, p. 29. This argument is without merit. The
underlying facts regarding the proceedings themselves were undisputed. The district
court simply needed to determine whether, under those facts, Republic failed as a matter
of law to exhaust its administrative remedies. Whether a party is required to exhaust
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administrative remedies is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. See Mack v. Utah State
Dept of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ^ 22, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79; see also Decker v. Rolfe,
2008 UT App 70,ffi[8-10, 180 P.3d 778 (holding that the determination of whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a
question of law). Thus, the court's determination was a legal one; it was not a
determination that was to be construed in a light most favorable to Republic.
4.

Republic Had an Obligation to Protect its Own Rights, Not Rely on
UDOT to Tell it How to Proceed.

Republic then complains that it is being held to an "omniscient standard," that it
had no way of knowing that the Lindal proceedings were formal. Republic's Brief, pp.
27-28. Republic could have asked; there is no evidence that it ever did. Nor is there any
evidence that Republic would have been prevented from presenting a GRAMA request to
UDOT to determine the nature of the proceedings. Alternatively, if Republic did not
know if the proceedings were informal or formal, Republic could have petitioned UDOT
to convert the Lindal proceedings to formal proceedings so that it could intervene to
present its position. Utah Admin. Rule R907-1-1 (2002). It would have learned through
that process that the proceedings were already formal. Republic could even have asked
the hearing officer to combine the Deck Hockey and Lindal proceedings into a single one
to determine who should be awarded a permit in the area. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(7).
Republic did none of those things.
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Republic attempts to excuse this failure by proposing that UDOT should have told
it that it had these alternate rights. Republic even complains that UDOT's counsel and
Reagan's counsel actually deliberately misled Republic. Even if that were true, neither of
those individuals had control over Republic's rights - the applicable statutes and rules
were determinative of those rights, and the ultimate decision-maker was the
administrative hearing officer, not counsel for Reagan or UDOT. Republic cannot assert
that it was entitled to rely on any counsel but its own to advise it of its rights.
Contrary to its assertion, Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 70, 180 P.3d 778, does not
support Republic's unique proposition that UDOT was obligated to relieve Republic of its
responsibility to consult the law to determine its own rights. That case is limited to its
facts, the statute at issue there, and prior appellate precedents interpreting that statute.
The language of the applicable statute provided that "'[a] person . . . whose [driver's]
license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the [Utah Driver License Djivision
may seek judicial review of the division's order." Id. at ^f 10. Nothing in the statute
prohibited direct judicial review after the order affecting license status, and the Court of
Appeals noted that it had previously interpreted the statute to relieve aggrieved parties
from the obligation to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking review. Id.
In addition to this statutory language, the plaintiff had received conflicting notices of his
remedies from the Division; first he was told he only had the right to appeal to the district
court, id., at \ 5, and later he was told that he had an option to request reconsideration, but
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also that this subsequent notice "does not replace any prior notice already in effect." Id.
at *U 6. On the basis of the statutory language existing at the time of the relevant events
and in light of the conflicting notices the Division had sent, the Court of Appeals
"conclude[d] that the district court had jurisdiction to review the Division's administrative action." Id. at f 11.
No similar facts or law exist in this case. The verbal comments of UDOT's and
Reagan's counsel were not the equivalent of the official notices that the Decker plaintiff
had received. Nor has Republic cited to any other "notice" from UDOT that "directed
Court appeal was the sole recourse of Republic." (Republic's Brief, p. 34). Further, the
applicable administrative rule in 2002 specifically stated that "Persons must exhaust their
administrative remedies in accordance with Section 63-46b-14, prior to seeking judicial
review." R907-1-15 (2002). Decker is simply inapposite.
Despite its protestations of helplessness, there is no basis in law or fact for
Republic's assertion that it had the right to be rescued by UDOT. Its failure to determine
the appropriate administrative remedies does not excuse Republic's failure to pursue
those available avenues of relief.
5.

The Deck Hockey Proceeding Was an Improper Venue to Challenge
the Lindal Permit.

Republic then asserts that pursuing its complaints regarding the Lindal Permit
within the confines of its own Deck Hockey proceedings was a sufficient pursuit of
administrative remedies. This is incorrect. Utah law is well-settled that objections to the
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proceedings of an administrative agency must be made while it has an opportunity to
correct them. Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(citing Paul v. City of Manhattan, 511 P.2d 244, 249 (Kan. 1973)). Had Republic
participated in the Lindal proceedings before the permit was granted, it might have
convinced the hearing office of the efficacy of its arguments, and the Liadal Permit might
not have been issued. Republic scoffs, and claims this avenue would have been futile,
pointing to the fact that the hearing officer announced in the Deck Hockey proceedings
how he would have ruled on Republic's arguments. (Republic's Brief, pp. 30-31).
Notably, the hearing officer had not made that announcement before the Lindal
proceedings concluded. There is no evidence except Republic's speculation that the
hearing officer might not have made a different ruling had the permit not already been
issued. Moreover, Republic's speculation as to what the hearing officer would have ruled
in the Lindal proceedings is irrelevant to the fact that Republic raised the argument in the
incorrect forum. If Republic had raised and lost the argument in the Lindal proceedings,
it would have had the right to appeal to the district court. Cf Holladay Towne Center,
LLC v. Holladay City, 2008 UT App 301, t 8, 192 P.3d 302 (holding that "'[t]he omission
of an imposed duty designed to advise an administrative body of [an error that could be
corrected]'" was mandatory, and that to hold otherwise "[would] accrue to the advantage
of the one who failed in the duty. This turns a delict into a triumph.'") (citations omitted).
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Republic failed to participate in the Lindal proceedings, and thus failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies concerning the issuance of the Lindal Permit.
The fundamental difference between raising its arguments concerning the Lindal
Permit in the Lindal proceedings vs. the Deck Hockey proceedings is Reagan's right to
participate and defend its rights. If Republic had won its arguments concerning the
validity of the Lindal Permit based on pre-issuance events, then Reagan would have had
the right to appeal to protect its interests. Post-issuance, what Republic effectively sought
to accomplish by challenging the (already-issued) Lindal Permit in the Deck Hockey
proceedings was to have UDOT revoke it. In other words, Republic wanted UDOT to
strip Reagan of its vested right to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on the Lindal
property. But after the Lindal Permit was issued, UDOT could revoke the permit only for
certain specified reasons, and then only in compliance with the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA")- See Utah Code. Ann. § 72-7-508(1) and (3). To protect
Reagan's due process rights, an adjudicative proceeding in which Reagan had a right to
participate and defend itself would have to be commenced. See, e.g., Brinton v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956 (Utah 1998) (any notion of fundamental fairness in
administrative proceedings includes the principle of the opportunity to rebut and defend
allegations of wrong-doing).
If Republic believed that Reagan had engaged in activities after the Lindal Permit
was issued that would be sufficient cause for revocation, then it could have filed a

Page 25 of 48

Request for Agency Action with UDOT, thereby commencing an adjudicative
proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l) (1991).4 See also Utah Admin. Code R.9071. Republic asserts that its request for rehearing of the initial denial issued by the Deck
Hockey hearing officer was such a Request for Agency Action. (Republic's Brief, pp.
34-36). Notably, Republic did not ask in that petition for UDOT to revoke Reagan's
permit; it only asserted that UDOT "was not at liberty to grant Reagan's application" over
Republic's. Id. at 35. At that point, the Lindal Permit had already been issued and the
sign erected. More fundamentally, however, Republic did not comply with Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(b), which requires that a person other than the agency who initiates
adjudicative proceedings "shall mail a copy to each person known to have a direct interest
in the requested agency action." Obviously Reagan would have had a direct interest in
any demand by Republic that UDOT revoke the Lindal Permit. Further, Reagan would
have been a party to any UDOT revocation proceeding, with full rights to participate to
protect its vested rights. There is no evidence that Republic ever even notified Reagan
that it was challenging the Lindal Permit. Indeed, it was not until long after the
administrative proceedings on the Deck Hockey application had concluded and Republic
had appealed that Republic took any action to involve Reagan - and that was only after it
"was forced to join Reagan as a party by order of the [district] court." (Republic's Brief,

4

The Administrative Procedures Act was recodified in 2008 at Title 63G, Chapter
4. Because the events at issue precede that recodification, this Brief will reference the
prior version of the Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b.
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p. 43). Republic argues that requiring it to simultaneously pursue a second administrative
action would have been absurd. (Republic's Brief, p. 33). Yet far from being "a
convenient means for administrative bodies to avoid judicial scrutiny," id., the protection
of Reagan's due process rights in an adjudicative proceeding in which it would have a
right to participate is an issue of constitutional proportions.
Republic was required to assert its arguments concerning the Lindal Permit sign in
the correct forum and proceedings, to wit, an administrative forum in which Reagan
would have been entitled to participate fully.5 If UDOT did not grant Republic's Request
for Agency Action and revoke the Lindal Permit, then Republic could have appealed that
determination to the district court, and Reagan would have had the right to participate in
that appeal. Republic failed to do so. The legal effect of its failure is that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Republic's arguments.
Republic's inaction precludes judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b14(2) (2001). Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction in regard to Republic's arguments concerning the Lindal
Permit. Republic offers no reason to overturn the district court's determination in regard
to Republic's untimely and improper attack of the Lindal Permits.

5

Contrary to Republic's protestations that it would have had no discovery rights at
the administrative level, the administrative rules applicable to UDOT allow for summons
to be issued (Utah Admin. Code R-907-l-10(14)(a) (2003) and for discovery "as may be
prescribed by and in the manner provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at
subparagraph (b).
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C

REPUBLIC'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING REAGAN'S R-407 APPLICATION ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AS THE DISTRICT
COURT NEVER MADE A RULING ON THE ISSUES RAISED.
Republic's third and fourth issues on appeal relate to its substantive arguments as

to how post-issuance events concerning Reagan's R-407 application affected the validity
of the Lindal Permit. See Republic's Brief, p. 2 ("Did the trial Court err in not finding
Reagan's altered R-407 [application for the Permit] to be a forged document?"), and p. 3
("Did the Court err in failing to recognize that Reagan's alteration of the R-407 form
constituted a new application without any retroactive effect?"). These issues were not
considered by the district court, as the court determined it had no subject matter
jurisdiction in regard to Republic's claims relating to the Lindal Permit. See Sept. Order,
K 3.05 (R.3483), ^f 4.10 (R.3485). "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eirnac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767
P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Once the district court determined that it had no
subject matter jurisdiction, that was the end of its inquiry. Accordingly, these issues are
not properly before this Court.6

6

Even if this Court found that the district court erred in some fashion by failing to
review these arguments, remand would make no difference in the outcome of this case.
As Reagan explained to the district court, should Republic prevail on these arguments, its
own permit application would also have to be rejected, because absent alterations to the
application, the billboard for which Republic applied was, without dispute, too large and
violated existing ordinances. (R. 1223-25.)
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D.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED IT LACKED
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER REPUBLIC'S
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO THE WILDERNESS PERMITS RAISED
IN THE "SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT",
Republic's fifth, seventh and eighth stated issues on appeal relate to the district

court's determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's arguments relating to the Wilderness Permits from UDOT and SSL. Once again,
some background information is helpful in order to understand the context in which
Republic asserts such arguments.
In 2004, Republic initiated its request for district court review of UDOT's denial
of Republic's Deck Hockey application. Republic subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, naming SSL and Reagan as defendants, and attempting to collaterally attack
Reagan's Lindal Permit. This is the subject of Republic's first, third, and fourth issues on
appeal, addressed supra.
Within this same action, Republic also filed a "Supplemental Complaint," vastly
expanding the scope of the proceedings before the district court, and asking that court
void UDOT and SSL permits on two other outdoor advertising signs owned by Reagan.7
Once again, this attempt to collaterally attack Reagan's permits was properly rejected by
the district court, again on the basis that Republic had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies. Republic presents this Court with no reason to disturb the lower court's ruling.

7

Republic's challenge as to the second of those two signs, i.e., the Russell sign, is
not an issue on appeal. See footnote 1, supra.
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1.

Republic Fails to Show the District Court Erred When it Determined
That Republic Failed to Exhaust its Administrative Remedies in
Relation to the SSL Wilderness Permit.

Republic argues in its seventh issue on appeal that the district court erred when it
held that Republic failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in relation to the SSL
Wilderness Permit. However, Republic does not address a single conclusion made by the
district court in this regard, or the underlying facts that support such conclusions. By
ignoring these determinations, Republic provides this Court with no basis to overturn
them. Once again, Republic sets forth no facts "sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case," Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^f 23,
116 P.3d 323, and fails to identify any particular legal flaw in the district court's analysis,
see Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, ^ 8, 217 P.3d 723.
The district court's undisputed factual findings included: Reagan applied for and
received the SSL Wilderness Permit in September 2005 (Sept. Order, % 1.16, R.3479), the
sign was built in January 2006 (id., ^ 1.18, R.3480), Republic submitted a GRAMA
request to SSL in February 2006 asking for information relating to this permit (id., ^
1.21), and Republic did not file an appeal of SSL's decision to issue this permit within the
next ten days after it admittedly had actual notice of the permit (id., *f 1.22). Based on
these factual findings, the district court determined that Republic was obligated to exhaust
its administrative remedies by filing an appeal with the SSL Board of Adjustment before
filing suit in district court to challenge the permit (R.3485-86). The district court then
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determined that Republic's failure to pursue its administrative remedies rendered the
district court without jurisdiction to consider the claims (id.), and that Republic's attempt
to circumvent this outcome by subsequently applying for a new billboard would not
confer standing or extend the time for appeal (R.3486).
Without question, these determinations were correct. Pursuant to SSL Ordinance
§17.02.030.K, Republic had ten days to appeal SSL's decision to issue the permit in question to SSL's Board of Adjustment. It is undisputed that Republic failed to do so. An
aggrieved person may file for judicial review only after submitting an appeal to the Board
of Adjustment, which must be made within 30 days after the Board's decision. SSL
Ordinance §17.02.030.K.2.
Republic does not challenge these particular findings and conclusions. Instead,
Republic argues that it did not have standing to challenge the SSL Wilderness Permit.
Under that argument, Republic's claim fails instantly. A litigant must have standing in
order to ask a court for relief "A private individual must both allege and prove special
damages peculiar to himself in order to entitle him to maintain an action to enjoin" a particular alleged violation. Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976). Without standing
to complain of the issuance of the SSL Wilderness Permit, Republic has no business asking this Court for anything in relation to that permit.
Republic then argues that it did not obtain standing until it applied for a permit on
the Network Electric property, a sign location that would have been within 200 feet of the
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already-permitted and constructed Wilderness sign. See Republic's Brief, pp. 17, 49-51;
Sept. Order, \ 5.06 (R.3486). Republic knew this proposed sign would be closer to the
Wilderness sign than municipal ordinance allowed. See Republic's Brief, p. 17. Nevertheless, Republic argues that its Network Electric application, and its subsequent attempts
to appeal SSL's denial of this new application, somehow constitute exhaustion of its
administrative remedies in relation to SSL's prior determination to grant the SSL
Wilderness Permit to Reagan. See Republic's Brief, pp. 49-51. Republic's position
ignores the ruling of the district court - that any argument relating to the Network Electric
application is superfluous, as it amounts to nothing more than a self-inflicted injury that
cannot circumvent proper pursuit of administrative remedies.
The district court determined that "Republic attempted to collaterally attack the
permit that SSL issued for the [Wilderness] sign by submitting a new application for a
billboard ("Network Electric") even closer to Wilderness than the Deck Hockey proposed
location; but a self-inflicted injury does not confer standing, nor can it extend the time for
appeal." Sept. Order, \ 5.06 (R.3486). Republic sets forth no argument or analysis as to
why this determination is incorrect. To the contrary, the law is clear that a self-inflicted
injury, one that the complainant imposes on itself by voluntarily undertaking to do or not
do something, does not confer standing. See Raymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ^f 7, 89 P.3d 171; Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen
v. Surface Transp. Bd., 457 F.3d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). If Republic
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suffered any damage as a result of its Network Electric application, it suffered such
damage only because it submitted that application for a location it knew was too close to
the Wilderness sign. But for this voluntary submission, Republic suffered no damage
from issuance of the SSL Wilderness Permit that would be any different than that suffered
by any other member of the community at large. The new application did not give
Republic standing to challenge the SSL Wilderness Permit.
Furthermore, in asserting that it was not an aggrieved party absent the Network
Electric application, Republic also ignores the district court's ruling to the contrary. The
district court found that in its pleadings filed with the court, Republic had "admitted that
its interests in the Deck Hockey location were adversely affected by SSL's decision to
issue the WLH permit, in that' if this Court upholds the validity of the [WLH] sign, then
the Deck Hockey sign would be within 500 feet of [WLH] and would not be a permissible
application. Thus, Republic clearly has standing to challenge the issuance of the [SSL]
permit, as well as the UDOT permit, on the [WLH] site.'" Sept. Order, par. 5.01, R.3485,
quoting Republic's Reply Memorandum to Reagan's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment Motion, p. 25. Republic does not mention this admission in its Brief.
Having failed to timely challenge the permit when it had the opportunity to do so as an
aggrieved party, Republic had no right to pursue any arguments regarding the SSL
Wilderness Permit in the district court.
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Republic's belated demands that SSL investigate the SSL Wilderness Permit
(Republic's Brief, pp. 50-51) were all made in the context of the Network Electric appeal.
Even if those demands were to be considered independently, Republic could not circumvent the appeals time by insisting that SSL take action to revoke the permit. In Foutz v.
City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 100 P.3d 1171, the plaintiffs similarly sought to circumvent the municipality's initial land use decision. In that case, the South Jordan City
Council had approved construction of structures that the plaintiffs alleged violated city
ordinances. Id. at \ 1. Long after the appeals time, and after the structures were built, the
plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to U.C.A. § 10-9-1002(l)(a) (2001), which allowed
private citizens to sue to enjoin allegedly unlawful uses (coined in the case as the "Enforcement section"). Id. at ^[4. The Court noted that the gravamen of the complaint was
the zoning administrator's initial decision to allow the allegedly unlawful activity. Id. at
<|23. The "Appeals section" of the statute required individuals challenging a municipality's land use decision to file suit within thirty days of the decision. Id. at \ 6. The
Court held that the plaintiffs could not miss the appeals time, and later argue that the use
was an ongoing enforcement issue that could be resolved via the Enforcement section.
Instead, they were obligated to timely appeal the initial decision that allowed the use:
Because virtually every challenge to a land use decision could be alternatively characterized as an "enforcement" action, allowing a challenge to a
municipality's land use decision under the Enforcement section would nullify the very existence of the exhaustion and timing requirements specified
in the Appeals section. We therefore hold that plaintiffs, as parties seeking
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redress from a municipal land use decision, were obligated to comply with
the requirements of the Appeals section.
Id. at ^f 14. The Foutz Court also went on to reject the argument that the appeal time
should have commenced when the city refused to reverse its original land use decision.
The Court instead held that those subsequent decisions could not "operate to artificially
lengthen the statutorily mandated time for challenging the land use decision." Id. at f 25.
Subsequent to the Foutz decision, the Utah Legislature codified the holding in that
case, eliminating the Enforcement section altogether, and tying the appeal time to the
initial land use decision:
The applicant, a board or officer of the municipality, or any person
adversely affected by the land use authority's decision administering or
interpreting a land use ordinance may, within the time period provided by
ordinance, appeal that decision to the appeal authority by alleging that there
is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the
land use authority in the administration or interpretation of the land use
ordinance.
U.C.A. § 10-9a-703.
The appeal time provided by SSL ordinance is ten days after the adversely affected
person receives notice of the decision. Ord. § 17.02.030.K.2. Republic had notice of
SSL's decision to issue the SSL Wilderness Permit as early as February 28th and no later
than April 1st, but filed no appeals whatsoever until after April 18th. Under the principles
announced in Foutz, and subsequently made crystal clear by the Legislature, Republic
cannot, by collateral attack through its Network Electric application or through its other
protestations to SSL regarding the permit, lengthen the time provided by SSL ordinances
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to challenge the City's decision to issue the WLH permit. The district court properly
found as a matter of law that "Subsequent demands that Republic made to SSL to revoke
the WLH permit also did not operate to extend the time to appeal." Sept. Order, par. 5.08
(R3486).
The remainder of Republic's argument on this point focuses on the merits of its
argument about the validity of Reagan's SSL Wilderness Permit. See Republic's Brief,
pp. 52-53. As set forth in section C of this Brief, this argument was not considered by the
district court, as it was moot once the district court determined it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. See Sept. Order, f 5.09 (R.3486). Accordingly, this argument is not properly
before this Court.
Republic has failed to show that the district court committed any error when it
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Republic's allegations
relating to the SSL Wilderness Permit. Because Republic did not exhaust its
administrative remedies, it could not present these arguments to the district court.
2.

Republic Fails to Show the District Court Erred When it Determined
That Republic Failed to Exhaust its Administrative Remedies in
Relation to the UDOT Wilderness Permit

Republic argues that the district court erred when it determined that Republic
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in relation to the UDOT Wilderness Permit.
Asserting that it did everything possible within the ten days that the district court gave it
to bring Reagan into the district court action, Republic claims it should be excused from
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taking what it alleges would have been futile efforts at the administrative level.
(Republic's Brief, p. 54). Once again, Republic fails to mention, let alone properly
attack, the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions. Thus, Republic fails to
set forth any reason to disturb the district court's determination.
The district court noted several undisputed facts with respect to the UDOT
Wilderness Permit. Reagan applied for and received the UDOT Wilderness Permit in
October 2005. Sept. Order, ^ 1.17 (R.3479).8 Reagan built the Wilderness sign in
January 2006. f 1.18 (R.3480). Although this sign was within 500 feet of the location
where Republic proposed to build its Deck Hockey sign, Republic took no steps to appeal
UDOT's decision to issue the Wilderness Permit within the 30 days after it undisputedly
knew that the sign had been built. Id., ^ 1.19, 1.23 (R.3480). Based on these undisputed
facts, the district court determined as a matter of law, that because Republic did nothing
to appeal UDOT's decision within 30 days after it undisputedly had notice of the permit,
as required by Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-3(4) and Utah Administrative Code R9071-3, Republic failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id., ^[ 4.01, 4.02, 4.08
(R.3483-84).
Republic does not set forth any meaningful challenge to these factual findings and
legal conclusions. In a footnote on p. 55 of its Brief, Republic does mention that it

8

It is undisputed that this occurred in 2005, despite the typographical error in the
district court's finding. See R.1332 and Exhibit Ml3 thereto.
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disagrees with the facts in paragraph 4.02, but provides no contrary record citation, or any
analysis of why it believes that this conclusion is incorrect.9
Republic also provides no analysis of the district court ruling that Republic failed
to follow its administrative remedies in relation to its October 2006 demand that UDOT
revoke the Wilderness Permit. Sept. Order,fflf4.03-4.08 (R.3484). Republic asserts only
that UDOT's failure to respond to its demand is evidence that administrative relief was a
futile endeavor. (Republic's Brief, pp. 54-55). That assertion ignores the district court's
conclusions of law that UDOT's failure to respond constituted final agency action, and
that Republic did not adequately or timely appeal from that final agency action. Sept.
Order, ^[ 4.05-4.08 (R.3484). Republic does not even mention these conclusions in its
Brief.
Republic's failure to brief these issues provides a basis for this Court to affirm the
district court's rulings: (1) that Republic should have appealed UDOT's decision to issue

9

Paragraph 4.02 states, "Republic did not file a request for agency action seeking
review of UDOT's decision to issue the Wilderness Permit within 30 days after UDOT
granted the permit, or within 30 days after Republic undisputedly had notice of the
permit." This paragraph was based on the district court's legal conclusion in paragraph
4.01 that "Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ('UAPA'), if the decision being
challenged is an application, then 'the request for agency action seeking review must be
filed with the agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules/ Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-3(4). Incorporating from Utah Administrative Code R907-1-3 the only appeals
period prescribed by UDOT's rules [30 days], UAPA requires that a request to review a
UDOT decision to grant or deny an application must be submitted within 30 days..." ^f
4.01, R.3483. Republic has provided no briefing as to why it believes this Conclusion of
Law is not correct.
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the Wilderness Permit no later than March of 2006, and (2), even if the October 2006
letter was an effective invocation of its administrative rights, Republic did not adequately
or timely appeal from UDOT's final agency action taken with respect to that letter.
Ignoring the district court's conclusion that it should have appealed no later than
March, 2006, Republic instead argues that its ability to pursue its administrative remedies
was restricted in some manner by the district court's October 2006 order that Republic
take steps within ten days to include Reagan as a party defendant to the action. A few
days after the October 3, 2006 hearing in which the district court announced that ruling,
Republic sent UDOT a letter demanding that it revoke the Wilderness Permit. Sept.
Order,ffif1.25, 1.25 (R.3480). UDOT sent a response to Republic on October 31, 2006,
and took no further action within 30 days of that letter. Id, ffif 1.28, 1.29 (R.3481).
Republic's argument that the ten days granted by district court to include Reagan
somehow prevented Republic from exhausting its administrative remedies is simply
unfounded. Nothing prevented Republic from pursuing its administrative rights prior to
being ordered in October 2006 to bring Reagan into the case. Republic had been on
constructive notice of the UDOT Wilderness Permit since January 2006 when the sign
was built. See R.3480. Republic undisputedly had actual notice of the permit at the end
of February 2006, see id, and it had been complaining about the sign to SSL throughout
the summer of 2006. Republic's Brief, pp. 50-51. The Court's October 2006 Order
simply had no effect on Republic's ability to pursue administrative remedies prior to then.
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Moreover, the district court asked Republic's counsel how much time he required
to take steps to bring Reagan into the proceeding, and counsel responded ten days. See
Transcript for Motion Hearing, p. 27, (R.989). Counsel made no mention of any concern
that the timing would somehow interfere with Republic's administrative remedies, even
though the district court had noted that the parties may be right back before it on a claim
that Republic had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id., pp. 17, 27. Had
Republic actually believed it was prejudiced by having to add Reagan as a party before
exhausting any administrative remedies it had left, it would have made some mention of
the same to the district court, and should have objected in some fashion to the court's
order. It did neither of these things. Accordingly, Republic's argument that it somehow,
in some unmentioned way, was unable to exhaust its administrative remedies because of
the district court's October 2006 Order is simply without merit.
This Court can readily dispose of the request that it "find and declare an exception
to the exhaustion requirement exists when a litigant is forced to prematurely sue another
party." Republic's Brief, p. 44. In addition to the fact that Republic was not prevented
from pursuing its administrative remedies months before the district court's order, Republic's request should be denied for failure to adequately brief the issue. "This court has
routinely declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal."
Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 904 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
{citing State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Cat. App.1992)); see also Tasters Ltd. v.
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Dep't of Employment Sec, 863 P.2d 12, 25 n. 15 (Utah Ct. App.1993), cert, denied, 878
P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Republic's argument consists of one paragraph (Republic's
Brief, pp. 43-44), and offers no legal analysis as to why a new exception should be
created, let alone applied to this case.
Exceptions to this rule are not created or applied at a whim. Instead, they "exist in
unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or
injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged
grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." State Tax
Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). Republic simply states that a new
exception should be created without explaining what remedies were otherwise available
and why it did not pursue them. This is insufficient to disturb the district court's ruling
that Republic did not avail itself of administrative remedies as to the SSL permit or the
UDOT permit. See Sept. Order,ffif4.08, 5.04 (R.3484, 3486).
Accordingly, Republic has provided no reason to disturb the district court's
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make any orders regarding the
UDOT Wilderness Permit.
E.

REPUBLIC FAILS TO SHOW ANY "BIAS" OR "MANIFEST
INJUSTICE".
Republic's sixth issue on appeal asserts that Republic should have been excused

from exhausting its administrative remedies because an exception exists where "bias or
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prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated." Republic's Brief, p. 44.10
However, Republic fails to set forth any facts that could substantiate such a conclusion
and fails to demonstrate any error committed by the district court in regard to this issue.
Republic fails to make even one single record citation for any of the allegations of
"fact" in its argument. See Republic's Brief, pp. 45-48. Republic thus fails to set forth
facts "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case."
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^f 23. In addition, Republic provides no legal
support for its argument. The Utah cases to which Republic cites do not even mention
bias or prejudgment, or what is necessary to show such bias or prejudgment in order to
meet an exception to the exhaustion rule. See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com% 2001 UT
74, 34 P.3d 180, and TDM, Inc. v. Tax Com% 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190. Instead,
these cases merely state the general rule that "parties must exhaust applicable

10

The district court noted that the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement that
Republic had argued were "(i) when exhaustion would serve no useful purpose, (ii) where
the agency has positively stated what its ruling will be in a particular case, and (iii) where
bias or prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated." Sept. Order.,§ 2.05
(R.3482). Republic does not challenge that ruling. Further, other than broadly citing to
three memoranda below that are comprised of a total of 289 pages (Republic's Brief, p. 4)
Republic has not shown where below it preserved its argument that this Court should consider whether "some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance..." (Republic's Brief, p. 45). In any event,
Republic had ample opportunity at the administrative level to challenge the actions of
UDOT's permits officer and its attorney. Republic has made no showing what the rulings
of the administrative hearing officer would have been had Republic taken the correct
course of action, i.e., one that would have given the hearing officer the power to affect
Reagan's permits, either before or after they were granted.
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administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review" and that "[exceptions to this rule exist in unusual circumstances [not involving bias or prejudgment.]"
Nebeker,

200117174,^14.

Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm % 106 P.3d 455 (Idaho 2005), to which Republic
cites, even if applicable here, demonstrates the paucity of Republic's argument, as the
Idaho Supreme Court required "specific facts" that "rise to the level necessary to infer
bias or prejudgment" on the part of the decision-maker at issue. Id. at 462-63. Because
the plaintiff in that case failed to provide such facts, its dismissal pursuant to a 12(b)
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was affirmed. Id.
Republic's argument fails for the same reason - Republic fails to set forth any
specific facts that could show any bias on the part of UDOT's hearing officer. Accordingly, Republic fails to show that the district court erred when it determined that Republic
was not excused from exhausting its administrative remedies.
Even if Republic could present facts sufficient to support its argument, that there
was some oppression being caused by UDOT's permits officer and attorney, Republic
still fails to present a reason to overturn the district court's ruling. Republic must
demonstrate it is the bias or prejudgments of the decision-maker that excuses the
exhaustion requirement. See Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm % 106 P.3d at 462.
(Exception exists "because '[t]he due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal.'") (citations omitted). The fact that there is a distinction between
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UDOTs hearing officer on the one hand, and UDOT's permits officer and its attorney on
the other hand, seems to be largely lost on Republic. Asserting that UDOT did this or that
UDOT said that, Republic attributes this conduct only once to the hearing officer:
"[Hjearing officer David Miles first approves (exparte) Reagan's R-407 [Permit
application] and then sits in judgment over Republic's challenge to that approval. What
more 'prejudgment' could ever be shown, over the exact same facts?" Republic's Brief,
p. 47. The fallacy of this statement in the context of Republic's failure to exhaust its
administrative remedies can be seen if a couple of words and phrases are interlineated
into Republic's statement:
[HJearing officer David Miles first approves (ex parte because Republic
failed to intervene in the Lindal proceedings) Reagan's R-407 [Lindal
application] and then sits in judgment over Republic's collateral challenge
in the Deck Hockey proceeding to that approval.
With these additional words and phrases, it becomes evident that Mr. Miles was not
determining the "exact same facts" in both proceedings, as Republic urges. Republic
never presented its "facts" in the Lindal proceedings; thus, Mr. Miles did not consider
them there. Once the Lindal Permit was issued, Mr. Miles could not take any steps to
affect the permit in the absence of Reagan. See argument, supra, at section B, subpoint 5,
p. 23. Republic failed to participate in the Lindal proceedings, and was thereafter
prohibited from collaterally attacking the permit in the Deck Hockey proceedings.
Republic's failures and improper challenge in the collateral Deck Hockey proceedings
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cannot be the basis for an inference that Mr. Miles was biased or that he had prejudged
anything.
This Court should therefore affirm the district court's ruling on summary judgment
that Republic "failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of material
fact that would demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies
requirements applies." Sept. Order, f 4.09.
F.

THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTED REPUBLIC A TRIAL DE NOVO,
AND PROPERLY LIMITED REPUBLIC TO INTRODUCING EVIDENCE
UNRELATED TO THE REAGAN PERMITS.
Republic's allegations regarding issuance of the Reagan permits have no

relevance, as a matter of law, to Republic's appeal of its Deck Hockey application. The
district court could not consider anything regarding the Wilderness sign. Instead, it was
obligated to "simply determine whether the application was rightly rejected. In determining that question, the court stands in the same position as the [administrative official]
did."). U.S. v. 4thDist Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1951), reh. den. 242 P.2d 774
(Utah 1952).
The legislature provided that any person aggrieved by the engineer's decision may bring an 'action in the district court for a plenary review thereof
and that the hearing therein 'shall proceed as a trial de novo.' The use of
the terms 'review' and 'trial de novo' indicate that the court shall review
only the issues of law and fact which were involved in the engineer's
decision. That is, whether the application shall be approved or rejected, and
as a corollary thereto whether on all the evidence adduced at such trial de
novo, the engineer's approval or rejection should be sustained, rejected or
modified.
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M a t 1135.
In the case at bar, the facts as they existed at the time of the original decision controlled whether the hearing officer was right or wrong. The construction of the WLH sign
(with the concomitant removal of the Lindal sign) occurred years after the hearing officer
had rejected the Deck Hockey application. As such, those events could not affect the
correctness of the hearing officer's decision.
Further, for the reasons set forth supra at section C, p. 28, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to make any determinations concerning the Lindal and Wilderness Permits. It
therefore could not have ordered either one of the permits revoked or the signs removed.
Republic was free to introduce any other evidence it desired (so long as that evidence
existed at the time of the hearing officer's decision). But all Republic wanted to talk
about was Reagan's signs. (Republic's Brief, pp. 36-37). Republic was not entitled to a
permit on the Deck Hockey property unless Reagan was deprived of either the Lindal or
the Wilderness Permits. Republic admitted as much in its counsel's colloquy with the
Court. See, Republic's Brief, pp. 36-37. The district court did not deny Republic a trial
de novo - it properly limited Republic to addressing issues for which it had adequately
exhausted its administrative rights.
CONCLUSION
To properly challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment, Republic
has the burden of setting forth all issues of disputed fact and to show lhat such facts are
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material. See Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 904 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). Republic has failed to do this. Republic must also show that the district
court erred when it applied the governing law to the undisputed facts of record. See
Panos v. Olsen and Assoc. Const, Inc., 2005 UT App 446, f 10, 123 P.3d 816. Republic
has failed to make this showing. Because Republic has not set forth a reason to reverse or
otherwise disturb the district court's determinations, those determinations should be
affirmed.
DATED this ZJ day of January, 2010.
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